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I. INTRODUCTION 
In March 2018, the State of Ohio filed suit against Precourt Sports 
Ventures (hereinafter “Precourt”) to enjoin Precourt from relocating their 
soccer franchise, the Columbus Crew, to Austin, Texas.1  Ohio alleged that 
Precourt and Major League Soccer (MLS) were legally prevented from 
relocating the team because of a unique Ohio statute which called for certain 
conditions to be satisfied before any professional sports team in the state 
could relocate.2  The case was dismissed on appeal because the court lacked 
jurisdiction, immediately shutting the door on exploring the team-city 
relationship of professional sports teams.3  Nevertheless, the suit shed light 
on a question that has yet to be answered: do municipalities have any 
protections in place to prevent a professional sports team’s relocation when 
the team’s stadium is built using the municipality’s own tax funds? 
 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2020, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.B.A., 2017, George 
Washington University. I would like to thank all the members and editors of the Seton Hall 
Legislative Journal for their hard work with this comment, and a special thanks to my family 
for their support and encouragement throughout my law school career. 
 1   See generally State ex rel. DeWine v. Precourt Sports Ventures LLC, 2018-Ohio-
2414, 1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018). 
 2   Id. at 1. 
 3   Id. at 4. 
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Professional sports teams, like all other for-profit businesses, prioritize 
profit maximization.4  Thus, when an out-of-state move seems fiscally 
advantageous for a team, it is unlikely that any loyalty to the present domain 
will prevail.5  Municipalities may find themselves strong-armed by a team’s 
threat of relocation, resulting in the municipality making concessions that it 
would otherwise not make.6  In such situations, state and local governments 
are seemingly stuck between the proverbial rock and a hard place; they must 
weigh upgrading or building a new stadium for the team against investing 
those same funds into other more essential services, such as education.7  As 
stadiums become more expensive to build, maintain and operate, cities and 
teams alike are recognizing that it is essential to protect such large 
investments.8  Today, those protections remain nonexistent in most 
jurisdictions.9  This comment aims to advance a legislative reform agenda 
that provides municipalities adequate protections for their tax investment 
against the relocation of the professional sports teams. 
Part II of this comment will provide a brief history of team relocations 
and highlight some historical misfortunes which have come at the hands of 
relocation efforts, showing the urgency in creating adequate protections.  
Part III will analyze the effectiveness of eminent domain and contract terms 
(both express and implied), legal theories previously used in attempts to 
prevent a team’s relocation, as adequate protectionary measures.  Part III will 
also look at the current legislative efforts taken to protect against team 
relocations, and the viability of such protections moving forward.  Part IV 
will conclude by proposing new legislation which, if enacted, will allow New 
Jersey municipalities to protect themselves against losing their professional 
sports franchises via relocation. 
 
 4   See Sports Law - Come Back, Shane: The Movement of Professional Sports Teams, 
LAW LIBRARY – AMERICAN LAW AND LEGAL INFORMATION, 
http://law.jrank.org/pages/10434/Sports-Law-COME-BACK-SHANE-MOVEMENT-
PROFESSIONAL-SPORTS-TEAMS.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2020) (“Owning a 
professional sports team is a risky, speculative endeavor, and owners must act to protect their 
interests and maximize the values of their franchises.”). 
 5   Id. (“The owners of professional sports teams have been able to obtain generous deals 
from city and state officials by threatening to move their franchises. If the owners do not 
receive the support they seek, they move their team to a more accommodating city.”). 
 6   Id. 
 7   Id. 
 8   See generally Non-Relocation Agreement between the City of Erie and Buffalo Bills, 
Inc., BUFFALO BILLS STADIUM LEASE (Dec. 21, 2012), 
http://www2.erie.gov/exec/sites/www2.erie.gov.exec/files/uploads/Buffalo% 
20Bills%20Non-Relocation%20Agreement.pdf (“[T]he Bills’ obligations under the Non-
Relocation Covenants are unique, are the essence of the bargain and are essential 
consideration for this Agreement . . .”). 
 9   Ohio is the only state to enact such protections; see generally Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 
9.67 (1996). 
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This comment will look at the viability of creating protections against 
the relocation of professional sports teams.  Specifically, it posits that first, 
eminent domain is not helpful in its present context because of violations to 
the United States Constitution and complexity with the “just compensation” 
and “public use” requirements.  Second, the inclusion of express terms in the 
municipality-team contract, while certainly a possible solution, can become 
impractical in light of imbalances in bargaining power among teams and 
cities.  Third, imputing implied terms to the municipality-team contact, while 
also possible, lacks the precision desired in view of the magnitude of the 
contractual undertaking.  Fourth, municipal use of tax funds to build or 
improve a stadium by its nature provide the basis for requiring municipalities 
to receive a value equivalent to the amount of tax funds given, before 
allowing a team within their jurisdiction to relocate.  Since this protection is 
too important to succumb to a court’s discretion in application, New Jersey 
must take the initiative to protect its municipalities by proposing full 
legislation in the form of a statute covering this arena. 
II. BACKGROUND/OVERVIEW 
The idea of sport subsidies began in 1951, when then Major League of 
Baseball (hereinafter “MLB”) commissioner, Ford Frick, decided the MLB’s 
professional baseball teams were generating excess value for other 
businesses in town, all of which the teams were unable to profit from through 
gate or stadium advertising.10  As a solution, Frick demanded that the home 
cities now support the league’s teams by building and maintaining new 
stadiums, funded with the municipality’s own taxpayer money.11  Fast-
forward nearly seven decades later and Frick’s demands continue to resonate 
just as loudly, if not louder, than they ever have. 
During the twentieth century, more than $20 billion was spent on 
professional ballparks, stadiums, and arenas.12  At least $14.7 billion of the 
$20 billion spent (nearly seventy-four percent) has come in the form of 
government subsidies.13  The problem has not improved with time either: 
$5.2 billion of these government subsidies were given between 1989 and 
1999 alone.14  From 2000 through the end of 2020, the National Football 
League (hereinafter “NFL”) alone will have successfully opened sixteen 
stadiums, fourteen of which together swallowed $5 billion in public 
 
 10   RODNEY D. FORT, SPORTS ECONOMICS 338 (2ND ED. 2006). 
 11   Id. 
 12   Raymond J. Keating, Sports Pork: The Costly Relationship between Major League 
Sports and Government, CATO INSTITUTE (Apr. 5, 1999), 
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa339.pdf. 
 13   Id. 
 14   Id. 
GULDNER(DO NOT DELETE) 4/4/2020  2:19 AM 
348 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 44:2 
funding.15  This figure does not include taxpayer subsidized stadium 
renovations by three other teams,16 amounting to $820 million.17  In 2017, 
Nevada shook this landscape even further when it promised to give a record-
breaking amount of nearly $1 billion to lure the Oakland Raiders to Las 
Vegas.18  The message has become loud and clear: when relocating, sport 
teams seek money—especially “free” money in the form of taxpayer 
funding—and try to secure as much as possible.  Yet, as you will see, 
promising these very coveted, large public contributions does not always 
guarantee the municipality will have its beloved team in the long term. 
In 1987, Bud Adams, owner of the then Houston Oilers, threatened to 
relocate his NFL team unless the city improved their existing stadium.19  
Fearful of losing the Oilers, Harris County20 met Adams’ demands and 
committed $67 million in taxpayer funding for the requested 
improvements.21  However, six short years later in 1993, even after securing 
funding for their stadium improvements and while the improvements were 
being made, Adams began petitioning Harris County for a completely new 
stadium.22  When Adams’ request was rejected by then-mayor Bob Lanier, 
Adams threatened to relocate the Oilers to Nashville, Tennessee.23  In August 
of 1995, Adams opened negotiations with Nashville, without informing 
Houston.24  Despite Mayor Lanier ultimately offering a new stadium, it was 
too little, too late for Adams.25  Adams announced an agreement relocating 
the Oilers to Nashville in November of 1995.26  Importantly, Nashville did 
not require Adams to pay a single dime to erect the new facility.27 
 
 
 15   Kevin Seifert, With $6.7 billion in public money, NFL closes stadium era, ESPN (Mar. 
28, 2017), http://www.espn.com/blog/nflnation/post/_/id/234573/with-6700000000-in-
public-money-nfl-stadium-era-closes. 
 16   Id. (These teams include the Green Bay Packers, Chicago Bears, and Kansas City 
Chiefs.). 
 17   Id. 
 18   Id. 
 19   Raymond J. Keating, The NFL Oilers: A Case Study in Corporate Welfare, 
FOUNDATION FOR ECONOMIC EDUCATION (Apr. 1, 1998), https://fee.org/articles/the-nfl-oilers-
a-case-study-in-corporate-welfare/. 
 20   Id. (Although named the “Houston Oilers,” the Oiler’s stadium was actually located 
in Harris County, Texas.). 
 21   Id. 
 22   Id. 
 23   Id. 
 24   Id. 
 25   Raymond J. Keating, The NFL Oilers: A Case Study in Corporate Welfare, 
FOUNDATION FOR ECONOMIC EDUCATION (Apr. 1, 1998), https://fee.org/articles/the-nfl-oilers-
a-case-study-in-corporate-welfare/. 
 26   Id. 
 27   Id. 
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Adams initially promised to play out the rest of the contract in the 
Harris County stadium.28  However, after having low attendance numbers 
during the 1996 season, Adams negotiated a buyout to play in Nashville two 
seasons sooner.29  So Harris County, even after succumbing to the Oilers 
demands and committing $67 million for stadium improvements, was 
nevertheless stood up by a franchise owner looking to leverage the “legalized 
larceny” landscape to garner tax breaks from local politicians.30  Thankfully, 
the NFL awarded Harris County an expansion franchise in the Houston 
Texans, which helped to shoulder the debt remaining from the Oiler’s 
agreed-upon stadium improvements years before.31 
At the same time, the Oakland Raiders were involved in a similar 
situation.  In 1995, the City of Oakland, California successfully courted the 
Los Angeles Raiders by committing $200 million of taxpayer funds to 
improve to the Oakland Coliseum.32  The Raiders would continue to play in 
the Coliseum for more than twenty-three years until 2018, when the team 
announced they would relocate.33  While more than two decades objectively 
may appear as an adequate tenure, the improvements to the Oakland 
Coliseum demanded by the Raiders in 1995 took twenty-five years to 
complete.34  The improvements requested in 1995 are on track to be 
completed by the end of 2020.35  On top of this, interest nearly doubled the 
initial project cost to $350 million.36  In 2017, the total cost remaining for 
the project was estimated to be $95 million, an amount which would be taken 
from Oakland taxpayers while the Raiders enjoy greener pastures in Las 
Vegas.37  With no team scheduled to play in the Coliseum at the time, the tax 
obligation of $13 million per year is placed upon the taxpayers to satisfy the 
property taxes through 2025.38  However, on December 23, 2019, the 
Oakland Athletics came to the rescue by purchasing the city’s stake in the 
Coliseum for $85 million.39  Although only acting as a temporary home as 
 
 28   Id. 
 29   Id.  
 30   Id. 
 31   Sports Law, supra note 4. 
 32   Patrick Redford, Oakland Taxpayers Will Still Be on The Hook For $163 Million After 
The Raiders And Warriors Leave, DEADSPIN (Mar. 29, 2017), https://deadspin.com/oakland-
taxpayers-will-still-be-on-the-hook-for-163-mi-1793801493. 
 33   Id. 
 34   Id. 
 35   Id. 
 36   Matier & Ross, Taxpayers’ tab for Coliseum redo: It’s even worse than you knew, 
S.F. CHRONICLE (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Taxpayers-
tab-for-Coliseum-redo-It-s-even-11034482.php. 
 37   Redford, supra note 32. 
 38   Redford, supra note 32. 
 39   CBS San Francisco, Alameda County Officials Approve Coliseum Ownership Sale To 
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they build their own, new ballpark, the Athletics’ purchase allowed the 
county to flip the payment and pay off the remaining debt obligations from 
the 1995 renovations.40 
These are among the most popular instances of team relocations, but 
they just begin to scratch the surface.41  Recently, in December 2018, 
Phoenix Suns owner Robert Sarver threatened to relocate his National 
Basketball Association (hereinafter “NBA”) team.42  However, a vote on the 
matter was tabled for a later time when the city found that “only [twenty] 
percent of area voters were in favor of the deal . . . with [sixty-six] percent 
opposed.”43  One month later, on January 23, 2019, the Suns agreed to a 
twenty-three year deal with the Phoenix City Council to renovate their arena 
instead of relocating.44  This situation only further proves that even today, 
the threat of relocation remains an important issue for cities across the 
country to address. 
Relocation on its face appears to be quite positive, forging a new bond 
between a municipality and the newly relocated team.  Yet, in practice, it has 
faced heavy opposition as far as the threat of relocation and actual practice 
of relocation has been weaponized by team owners to extract concessions 
from municipalities of the sort unlikely to redound to taxpayers’ best 
interests.  Municipalities have recently taken initiatives to mitigate, if not 
preempt, such abuses by using various legal theories such as eminent domain 
and contractual terms as measures to prevent certain relocation efforts.  The 
following section will look at the application of those theories and their 
viability to prevent relocation measures. 
 
 
Oakland A’s, CBS NEWS (Dec. 23, 2019), 
https://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2019/12/23/alameda-county-officials-approve-coliseum-
complex-sale-to-oakland-as/. 
 40   Id. 
 41   Robin Respaut, With NFL Rams gone, St. Louis still stuck with stadium debt, REUTERS 
(Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.reuters .com/article/us-sports-nfl-stadiums-insight-
idUSKCN0VC0EP (“Seattle’s Kingdome bonds were retired only last year, 15 years after the 
facility was imploded in 2000. Philadelphia has $160,000 left to pay on Veterans Stadium, 
more than a decade after the facility was torn down. Debt from Indianapolis’ Hoosier Dome 
- demolished in 2008 - still hadn’t been paid off in 2013, according to state filings.”). 
 42   Des Bieler, Phoenix Suns owner reportedly threatens to move team to Seattle or Las 
Vegas, THE WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 12, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2018/12/13/phoenix-suns-owner-reportedly-
threatens-move-team-seattle-or-las-vegas/?utm_term=.50c9cc267920. 
 43   Id.  
 44   Bill Bradley, Phoenix vote ends speculation of Suns’ move to Las Vegas, LAS VEGAS 
REVIEW-JOURNAL (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.reviewjournal.com/sports/basketball/phoenix-
vote-ends-speculation-of-suns-move-to-las-vegas-1580459/. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
Previous attempts to prevent a sports team’s relocation have largely 
rested in eminent domain, contract terms, and in one case, state law.  Under 
these theories, individuals have sought to gain ownership of teams, land, and 
stadiums themselves.  However, how these legal theories ultimately stack up 
to the adequate protectionary measures required today by municipalities, in 
practice, remains unseen.  Thus, the following analysis will highlight these 
theories in practice, their benefits and shortcomings, and room, if any, for 
improvement. 
A. Eminent Domain 
Eminent domain is a right bestowed upon both citizens and the 
government to legally take private property for some public use.45  Vested 
by the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, eminent domain 
has historically been used to take an individual’s private land and convert it 
to a public use.46  The State of New Jersey allows vast use of eminent domain 
by both the government and private individuals.47  In fact, the sole limitations 
New Jersey places on eminent domain are for “just compensation” and 
“public use.48  However, does a sports stadium count as public use? 
In 1971, New Jersey enacted the New Jersey Sports & Exposition 
Authority Law,49 which founded the New Jersey Sports & Exposition 
Authority (hereinafter “Authority” or “NJSEA”). The Authority serves as 
“an instrumentality of the State exercising public and essential governmental 
functions.”50  The Authority was created in anticipation that professional 
sports teams would relocate to New Jersey at the Meadowlands Sports 
Complex.51  Since New Jersey allows for the use of eminent domain by 
political subdivisions,52 the Authority would have the power to invoke 
eminent domain and seize land at the site of the future Meadowlands 
complex.53  Upon doubts from one official appointed within the group, the 
Authority sought a declaratory judgment on the constitutional validity of the 
law.54  The Superior Court held that the law was constitutional because “the 
 
 45   Eminent Domain, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/eminent_domain (last visited Feb. 2, 2020). 
 46   Id. 
 47   See generally N.J. Const., Art. I, par. 20. 
 48   Id. (“Individuals or private corporations shall not be authorized to take private 
property for public use without just compensation first made to the owners.”). 
 49   N.J.S.A. § 5:10-1. 
 50   N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 292 A.2d 580, 583 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1971). 
 51   Id. at 583. 
 52   N.J. Const., Art. IV, § 6, par. 3. 
 53   N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 292 A.2d 580, 584 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1971). 
 54   Id. 
GULDNER(DO NOT DELETE) 4/4/2020  2:19 AM 
352 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 44:2 
act is a reasonable exercise of the police power in that it is general law with 
a public purpose and will greatly enhance the general welfare of the citizens 
of New Jersey.”55  The court acknowledged “the view that the construction 
and maintenance of stadiums and related facilities constitutes a public 
purpose has received virtually universal approval in most jurisdictions.”56  
The court further noted that “health, recreation and sports are encompassed 
in and intimately related to the general welfare of a well-balanced state”57 
and that “[o]ne of the tests of public use must surely be not so much how the 
use is furnished but rather the right of people to receive and enjoy its 
benefit.”58  Under this court’s broad interpretation of justified eminent 
domain uses, a municipality may condemn private land in order to build a 
sports complex for a professional sports team.  This use of eminent domain 
would presumably constitute a public purpose under this broad definition.  
However, the court refrained from ruling whether a municipality could 
condemn the actual sports team itself. 
In 1982, Oakland, California attempted to invoke eminent domain as a 
method to prevent the Oakland Raiders from relocating to Los Angeles.59  
This time, unlike NJSEA, the city was attempting to condemn the team itself 
instead of the facility’s land.60  The Supreme Court of California held that 
“the acquisition and, indeed, the operation of a sports franchise may be an 
appropriate municipal function.  If such valid public use can be 
demonstrated, the statutes discussed herein afford City the power to acquire 
by eminent domain any property necessary to accomplish that use.”61  Thus, 
public use is key.  Essential to the court’s holding was the idea that intangible 
property may be condemned, drawing from a determination that “[a] 
franchise is property, and nothing more.”62  Indeed, the court there reasoned 
that it was “aware of nothing peculiar to a franchise which can class it higher, 
or render it more sacred, than other property.”63 
The court discussed the difference between condemning a team and 
condemning the facility they play in.64  In its analysis, the court determined 
there is no legal basis for concluding that the difference is legally substantial, 
 
 55   Id. at 640. 
 56   Id. at 598. 
 57   Id. 
 58   Id.  
 59   City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 63 (1982). This is the same 
Raiders team that would return to Oakland in 1995, only to leave again in 2018. 
 60   Id. In N.J. Sports & Exposition, the authority was attempting to condemn the land 
which the Meadowlands complex would be built, not a team. 
 61   Id. at 72 (emphasis added). 
 62   Id. at 66 (citing W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848)). 
 63   Id. 
 64   City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal.3d 60, 72 (1982). 
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but also did not foreclose the trial court from determining the opposite: 
Is the obvious difference between managing and 
owning the facility in which the game is played, and 
managing and owning the team which plays in the facility, 
legally substantial? To date, respondents have not presented 
a valid legal basis for concluding that it is, but we do not 
foreclose the trial court’s reaching a different conclusion on 
a fuller record.65 
It is important to acknowledge that the Supreme Court of California is not 
saying that a sports team undoubtedly will satisfy the public use requirement; 
rather, the court is saying that so long as a public use is proven, the 
acquisition and operation may rise to the level of a municipal function for 
which eminent domain may be possible.66  Due to the court’s lack of a 
concrete determination on whether a sports team itself can be condemned, 
municipalities still find themselves lost on how eminent domain will provide 
protections in relocating situations. 
In 1984, the Baltimore Colts publicly considered relocating to 
Indianapolis.67  In response, the Maryland General Assembly passed 
emergency legislation which authorized Baltimore to condemn a sports 
franchise under eminent domain.68  The legislature opined that if it could 
pass this legislation prior to the Colts relocation, then the State could 
successfully invoke eminent domain to seize the Colts and prevent the 
relocation altogether.69  Before Maryland had the opportunity to pass this 
emergency legislation though, Colts owner Jim Irsay heard of such 
rumblings and proceeded to immediately move his team to Indianapolis.70  
The team—and all its property—abandoned Baltimore one day before the 
legislation was passed.71 
Nevertheless, Baltimore still brought suit against the Colts, seeking to 
enforce a condemnation of the team.72  The court ultimately held that 
Baltimore lacked sufficient power to condemn the Colts because “just 
compensation” is a crucial aspect of eminent domain and, at the time, 
Baltimore had not made any payment to the Colts which constituted such 
just compensation for the team.73  Furthermore, the court found that even 
 
 65   Id. at 72. 
 66   Id. 
 67   Baltimore v. Balt. Football Club, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 278, 279 (D. Md. 1985). 
 68   Id. at 280. 
 69   Id. at 279. 
 70   Id.  
 71   Id.  
 72   Id.  
 73   Baltimore v. Balt. Football Club, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 278, 284 (D. Md. 1985). 
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despite this shortcoming, “the Colts franchise had left Maryland by the time 
the City instituted the condemnation proceedings,” and thus “the inescapable 
conclusion is that the franchise is beyond the jurisdictional reach of 
Baltimore City.”74  It is crucial to note that the court never explicitly stated 
that it was impossible to invoke eminent domain to legally condemn a team.  
However, Baltimore lacked the power to condemn the Colts because of a 
lack of just compensation and the lack of the court’s jurisdiction over the 
team, as the organization was no longer located in Maryland.75 
One year later, in City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders,76 the California 
Court of Appeals struck Oakland’s exercise of eminent domain over the 
city’s NFL franchise. The court held that condemning the Raiders through 
eminent domain violated the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution.77  The court concluded that “the burden that would be imposed 
on interstate commerce outweighs the local interest in exercising statutory 
eminent domain authority over the Raiders franchise.”78  The court also 
recognized that if they were to permit condemnation of the Raiders through 
eminent domain, it would necessarily implicate an indefinite bar on the 
Raiders franchise from ever leaving Oakland, thus violating the commerce 
clause and rending it unconstitutional.79  The majority of the court found that 
the local interests pursued by Oakland were not sufficiently compelling to 
justify eminent domain: 
Plaintiff here does not seek to promote the health or 
safety of its citizens, or even, as in Partee, promote fair 
economic competition. Instead it seeks to act for what may 
be presumed, for purposes of analysis, to be legitimate, but 
less compelling reasons: to promote public recreation, social 
welfare, and to secure related economic benefits, as well as 
to best utilize the stadium in which the Raiders played.80 
Under existing legal precedent at the time of this case, condemning a team 
would be prohibited because its purposes in promoting public recreation, 
social welfare, and economic benefits are insufficient to satisfy the public 
use requirement.81  Thus, eminent domain failed to provide cities with an 
appropriate protection against teams relocating because of uncertainty in 
defining a “public use” and violations of the commerce clause. 
 
 74   Id. 
 75   Id. at 289. 
 76   See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 220 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1985). 
 77   Id. at 154. 
 78   Id. at 158. 
 79   Id. at 157. 
 80   Id. at 158. 
 81   Id.  
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To analyze whether these relocations efforts would fare differently 
today, we must look at how eminent domain has evolved.  In Kelo v. City of 
New London, 82 a case decided nearly twenty years after City of Oakland, the 
Supreme Court of the United States expanded the public use requirement 
tremendously: 
[T]he Court today significantly expands the meaning 
of public use. . .it holds that the sovereign may take private 
property currently put to ordinary private use, and give it 
over for new, ordinary private use, so long as the new use is 
predicted to generate some secondary benefit for the 
public—such as increased tax revenue, more jobs, maybe 
even aesthetic pleasure.83 
Based on this expansion, seemingly any mere benefit to the public will be 
sufficient to constitute public use, including aesthetics.84  Using this as a 
backdrop, a municipality may argue that condemning a team through 
eminent domain generates many secondary benefits, including revenue from 
games and enjoyment on behalf of fans.  Since increased city revenues and 
enjoyment of games benefit the public at large, these benefits may arguably 
constitute public use today, even if they would not have in the past.  Such an 
argument is likely to succeed as the Court in Kelo recognized that eminent 
domain can be used to take property specifically designated for stadiums: 
“the sovereign may transfer private property to private parties, often 
common carriers, who make the property available for the public’s use—
such as with a railroad, a public utility, or a stadium.”85 
Bruce Ratner exposed this idea when he decided to move his team, the 
New Jersey Nets, to Atlantic Yards in Brooklyn.86  In Goldstein v. Pataki, 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York 
considered whether the government can utilize eminent domain to obtain 
land for construction of an arena.87  The plan proposed by Ratner’s company 
was to construct a twenty-two-acre development that would consist of 
housing, office space, and parks surrounding a new arena.88  The local 
government declared the area blighted and qualified Atlantic Yards as a land 
use development project.89  By declaring the area blighted, the government 
opened the door to utilizing eminent domain to legally take private property 
 
 82   Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 501 (2005). 
 83   Id. at 501.  
 84   Id. at 481. 
 85   Id. at 498. 
 86   See generally Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F. Supp. 2d 254 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 87   Id. 
 88   Id. 
 89   Id. at 256. 
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within the designated area, including Plaintiff Daniel Goldstein’s 
residence.90  The court found that the taking in question satisfied the public 
use requirement.91  The court clarified its view of when the public use 
requirement fails: 
[A] taking fails the public use requirement if and only 
if the uses offered to justify it are ‘palpably without 
reasonable foundation,’ such as if (1) the ‘sole purpose’ of 
the taking is to transfer property to a private party, or (2) the 
asserted purpose of the taking is a ‘mere pretext’ for an 
actual purpose to bestow a private benefit.92 
Essentially, absent proof that the development will not provide benefits to 
the area or evidence of a purely private driving interest, the public use 
requirement will be met and eminent domain would be permissible.93  The 
court further noted that “[w]hether the Project will in fact achieve this 
[benefit] or any other objective is not a matter that this court may consider.”94  
In other words, the public use requirement looks only to the intended public 
use; whether that use is achieved does not truly matter.  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed this ruling, explaining that 
courts should rarely intervene on whether a taking satisfies the public use 
requirement: “‘[t]here is, of course, a role for courts to play in reviewing a 
legislature’s judgment of what constitutes a public use, even when the 
eminent domain power is equated with the police power,’ but the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly ‘made clear that it is “an extremely narrow” one.’”95  
Under such reasoning, there is nothing to prevent a legislature from offering 
slightly questionable public uses as reasoning to invoke eminent domain.  
Further, since judicial review occurs in only narrow circumstances, this 
questionable reasoning will likely succeed.  Such a situation is exactly what 
transpired in Goldstein.96  Thus, arguing that a team satisfies the expanded 
public use requirements because the public can now enjoy their games and 
benefit from the tourism influx suddenly carries legitimate weight. 
 
 
 
 90   Id. 
 91   Goldstein, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 291. 
 92   Id. at 286. (citations omitted). 
 93   Id. at 288-89. 
 94   Id. at 287 n.12 (“Whether the Project will in fact achieve this or any other objective 
is not a matter that this court may consider.”) (citing Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 
469, 488 (2005) (“rejecting the argument that courts should require a ‘reasonable certainty’ 
that expected public benefits will accrue.”). 
 95   Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 57 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 
U.S. 26, 32 (1954); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984)). 
 96   See generally Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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At this point, the only remaining element to justify eminent domain is 
the payment of just compensation on behalf of the municipality.97  This 
requirement ultimately becomes a major downfall of eminent domain as a 
viable legal theory to protect against team relocations.  The reason for this is 
because the purchasing and selling market for teams is unique in that teams 
often sell for prices in excess of what they are truly worth.98  Along with 
immeasurable things like goodwill and history, part of the value paid for is 
the perceived “trophy” value of the team.99  One financial analyst even 
stated, “the value of professional sports franchises will continue to depend 
on the willingness and availability of individuals wealthy enough to pay . . . 
to own these “trophy” assets.”100 
Nontangible property undoubtedly factors into the value of the team, 
but due to the nature of the property, it is hard to clearly identify.  Owners of 
teams should, in theory, always argue for more value attributed to these 
nontangible factors since it will inflate the value of the franchise altogether.  
To the contrary, municipalities should always argue for less value because 
this would take away some of the leverage which teams start with.  Agreeing 
to a satisfactory valuation is key since one does not want an outside party 
weighing in; allowing a third party to unilaterally determine a sufficient 
value of just compensation may result in the franchise being severely 
undervalued or overvalued and, in both situations, one party loses.  This 
hurdle is simply too high and impractical to jump over in many cases. 
Eminent domain may be a legally permissible way to prevent a team 
relocation once satisfying the public use and just compensation 
requirements.  However, the nature of the just compensation requirement can 
be quite speculative, rendering the taking’s power impractical, if not ill 
advised in this setting.  The following section examines real contracts used 
by teams, highlighting the protections (or lack thereof) in each, and 
analyzing the viability of employing contractual terms as a main 
protectionary measure to relocation. 
B. Contracts 
An analysis of twenty-three stadium agreements between NFL teams 
and their home cities, executed between 1984 and 2005, shows that every 
single contract failed to contain explicit protections for the municipality 
 
 97   See N.J. Const., Art. I, par. 20. (“Individuals or private corporations shall not be 
authorized to take private property for public use without just compensation first made to the 
owners.”). 
 98   David Turney, Professional Sports Franchise Valuation, TOPTAL, 
https://www.toptal.com/finance/mergers-and-acquisitions/sports-franchise-valuation. 
 99   Id. 
 100   Id. 
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against a team relocation.101 
Within every contract, the terms of the agreement can be either express 
or implied.102  An express term is a term clearly spelled out in the contract, 
while an implied term is one which is not actually written in the contract, but 
implied into the contract by a court and enforceable as if it was expressly 
written.103  Express terms are relatively straightforward; terms that are 
expressly included within the contract are usually enforced.104  By putting 
protections against relocation into the contract itself as express terms, 
municipalities in theory should have a fully legally enforceable method to 
invoke when their team attempts to relocate.105 
The first contract analyzed is the Cleveland Browns 1996 agreement 
with the City of Cleveland, precipitating the teams return.106  In the contract, 
the parties agreed to give Cleveland the ability to terminate the contract upon 
specific conditions.107  These conditions included default, dissolution of the 
franchise, and bankruptcy, meaning that if the team defaulted on their loan, 
dissolved, or went bankrupt, then Cleveland could rescind the contract 
without penalty.108  This provision was unilateral, as only Cleveland had this 
power.109  These conditions are unique, because they provide the 
municipality with protections if the franchise were to fail or go under.  
However, these parameters would not provide any protection to the 
municipality in the case of relocation.  Aside from a thirty-year lease term, 
nothing within the contract protects the municipality’s public investment in 
the Browns.110  Furthermore, a long lease term arguably lacks sufficient 
 
 101   See generally Professional Sports Facility Lease Summaries (NFL), (Summer 2012), 
https://law.marquette.edu/national-sports-law-institute/professional-sports-facility-lease-
summaries. 
 102   Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 188 (1992) (“[I]t is true that the terms 
to which the contracting parties give assent may be express or implied in their dealings . . . .”). 
 103   See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 4 cmt. a (“[j]ust as assent may be manifested 
by words or other conduct, sometimes including silence, so intention to make a promise may 
be manifested in language or by implication from other circumstances.”). 
 104   See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 203(b) (“[E]xpress terms are given greater 
weight than course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade, course of 
performance is given greater weight than course of dealing or usage of trade, and course of 
dealing is given greater weight than usage of trade.”). 
 105   If a team were to relocate in violation of their contract, they would be liable under a 
breach of contract theory.  
 106   Lease by Way of Concession between the City of Cleveland, Ohio and Nat’l Football 
League, CLEVELAND BROWNS STADIUM LEASE SUMMARY (April 26, 1996), 
https://law.marquette.edu/assets/sports-law/pdf/ls-nfl-cleveland.pdf [hereinafter “Browns 
Contract”]. 
 107   Id. 
 108   Id. 
 109   Id. 
 110   Even as a year term, these are not even really protections because there are other ways 
around it, like buyouts. 
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power to even constitute a legitimate protection to relocation in itself, 
evidenced through the Raiders relocating immediately despite having 
multiple years left on their lease.111  Even with Cleveland’s express 
termination term, in reality this protection is useless against relocation. 
In 2012, the Buffalo Bills brought a glimmer of hope to using express 
terms as a protectionary measure.112  The stadium contract executed in 2012 
shows that both sides explicitly recognized that non-relocation clauses are 
an “essential consideration” for agreements between teams and cities.113  
Such an acknowledgement proves the magnitude of the situation and the 
importance of protections.  As part of their contract, Erie County specifically 
negotiated for a binding non-relocation agreement, secured by right of 
specific performance and backed by a $400 million fee.114  Essentially, this 
provision means that if the Bills were to relocate while still under their lease, 
Erie County could sue for specific performance, forcing the Bills to play out 
the rest of their contract.115  Alternatively, Erie County could sue for damages 
in the amount of $400 million—a figure worth more than ten times the 
capital investment of $35 million the Bills provided.116  In return, the Bills 
are permitted to buy themselves out of the last three years of the contract for 
$28 million, but only after the first seven years of the lease have passed.117  
The contract specifically prevents the Bills from (1) applying to play in a 
different stadium; (2) moving the team to a new location; (3) selling the team 
to an owner who intends to relocate; (4) entertaining offers to relocate the 
team; and, (5) transferring or surrendering the team where they would play 
their games in a different stadium or not at all.118 
Since the Bills explicitly wrote this non-relocation term into the 
contract, this term constitutes an express term.119  While encouraging as a 
protectionary measure, this example poses itself as an outlier because of the 
nature of the Bills contract.  First, since this agreement included only 
 
 111   Keating, supra note 19. 
 112   Despite being called the Buffalo Bills, the Bill’s hometown is actually Erie County. 
 113   Non-Relocation Agreement between the City of Erie and Buffalo Bills, Inc., BUFFALO 
BILLS STADIUM LEASE (Dec. 21, 2012), 
http://www2.erie.gov/exec/sites/www2.erie.gov.exec/files/uploads/Buffalo%20Bills%20No
n-Relocation %20Agreement.pdf. 
 114   Lease between the County of Erie and Buffalo Bills, Buffalo Bills Lease Terms 
Summary (Dec. 21, 2012), http://www2.erie.gov/exec/index.php?q=buffalo-bills-lease-
terms-summary. 
 115   Id. 
 116   Id. 
 117   Id. 
 118   Id. 
 119   What is EXPRESS TERM?, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 
https://thelawdictionary.org/express-term/ (“A rule in a contract that is clearly written or 
spoken.”). 
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improvements to the stadium, the cost and length of the project pales in 
comparison to total relocation efforts.120  The contract here runs for merely 
ten years, although the Bills have an option to buy themselves out of the 
contract after year seven.121  For most cities, especially those courting a 
brand-new team, ten years is unusually short when committing to building a 
completely new stadium.122  The Bills were able to negotiate such a small 
lease term because the agreement revolved around improvements to an 
already existing stadium instead of construction of a new stadium, thus less 
money was needed.123  With less money and a shorter lease length on the 
table, negotiating for certain conditions—like protections on relocation—is 
easier to accomplish because the parties are only bound by them for a few 
years.  On the other hand, if a team were to require a new $800 million 
stadium—which is more likely when teams look to relocate124—then the 
municipality will often seek much longer lease terms.125  Since a team is less 
likely to breach a short term lease because the lease ends sooner, the 
exorbitant $400 million penalty for relocating becomes less powerful.  Also, 
by giving the Bills an option to opt out of their contract after seven years, 
these upgrades in reality need to be sufficient for just these first seven years, 
at which point the Bills can uproot and relocate wherever they desire.126 
Terms not expressly written in the agreement may be enforceable 
too.127  Occasionally, courts will read unwritten terms into contracts, even if 
the terms are not present within the four corners of the document.128  These 
 
 120   See generally Professional Sports Facility Lease Summaries (NFL), (Summer 2012), 
https://law.marquette.edu/national-sports-law-institute/professional-sports-facility-lease-
summaries. 
 121   See Lease between the County of Erie and Buffalo Bills, Buffalo Bills Lease Terms 
Summary (Dec. 21, 2012), http://www2.erie.gov/exec/index.php?q=buffalo-bills-lease-
terms-summary. 
 122   See Las Vegas Review-Journal, Stadium and rent details for all 32 NFL teams (Mar. 
5, 2017, 10:28AM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/sports/raiders-nfl/stadium-and-rent-
details-for-all-32-nfl-teams/ (showing the most recent new stadium leases including the 
Atlanta Falcons in 2017, Minnesota Vikings in 2016, New York Giants in 2010, and New 
York Jets in 2010, all negotiated lease terms of at least 30 years.). 
 123   The agreement centered on improvements to the Bills venue at the time, Ralph Wilson 
Stadium.  Ralph Wilson Stadium was renamed to New Era Field in 2015. 
 124   $800 million is a figure used solely for discussion purposes.  However, new stadiums 
often reach far above this number, including the new Las Vegas stadium discussed earlier 
which will cost nearly $1 billion. 
 125   Las Vegas Review-Journal, supra note 122. 
 126   Albeit, the Bills would be required to pay their relocation fee first. 
 127   McCabe Rabin, P.A., What are the implied terms in a contract?, MCCABE RABIN, 
P.A., https://www.mccaberabin.com/business-copyright-faq/what-are-the-implied-terms-in-
a-contract/. 
 128   Kas Oriental Rugs, Inc. v. Ellman, 394 N.J. Super. 278 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) 
(“[W]hen a contract is found to have emanated from an agreement on essential material terms, 
a court will also fill the gaps created by the parties’ silence by adding terms that accomplish 
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are known as implied terms. New Jersey is one state which recognizes an 
implied covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing.129  This means that “a 
party must act in a way that is honest and faithful to the agreed purposes of 
the contract and consistent with the reasonable expectations of the 
parties.”130  The Supreme Court of New Jersey described their stance on this 
term in Sons of Thunder v. Borden, Inc.: 
This Court has stated that “[i]n every contract there is 
an implied covenant that ‘neither party shall do anything 
which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right 
of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract; in other 
words, in every contract there exists an implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing.’”131 
The term implies in all contracts, regardless of whether the parties explicitly 
negotiated for the term.132  Since this term is implied in all contracts, it 
necessarily applies in all sports team contracts as well. 
Breach of this implied term requires an injury to the “fruits of the 
contract” to one party.133  A “fruit” in this sense is “the equivalent of the 
parties’ reasonable expectations that may or may not be set out expressly in 
the contract.”134  In other words, the “fruits of the contract” are the expected 
benefits that either side would receive if the contract was fully executed.  
This could be anything from profits to real property, so long as it was a 
reasonable expectation held by at least one party.135  When a team 
purposefully relocates while still under their contract, it destroys the fruits of 
the contract because the team is thereafter performing their service—the 
fruits which they specifically contracted for with the original municipality—
in another area. Downstream fruits—fruits enjoyed indirectly from the 
contract, such as goodwill—will also sour by a team’s relocation.136  As a 
 
a result that was necessarily involved in the parties’ contractual undertaking.”). 
 129   See generally Sons of Thunder v. Borden, Inc., 148 N.J. 396, 420 (1997).  
 130   N.J. Model Civil Jury Charges § 4.10(J) (2011). 
 131   Sons of Thunder, 148 N.J. at 420 (1997); see also Hills v. Bank of Am., Civil Action 
No. 13-4960 (ES) (MAH), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32502 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2015). 
 132   Sons of Thunder, 148 N.J. at 420 (1997). 
 133   Id. at 418. 
 134   Tory Weigand, The Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Commercial Contracts 
in Massachusetts, 88 MASS. L. REV. 174-96, 182 (2004). 
 135   Parties can negotiate whatever expectations they desire, so what qualifies as an 
expectation is case sensitive. 
 136   Branson Wright, Cleveland Browns Move to Baltimore Left City Stunned, left city 
stunned, angered: PD 175th, CLEVELAND.COM (Apr. 30, 2017), 
https://www.cleveland.com/ohio-sports-
blog/2017/04/cleveland_browns_move_to_balti.html. (When the Browns relocated, “Modell 
became Public Enemy No. 1 in Cleveland. Fans wore shirts with disparaging comments about 
the owner.”). 
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result, the municipality will suffer deprivation of all the fruits they contracted 
for if a team were to completely relocate. 
The important question remains whether such a term as defined can 
apply in a way to provide cities with the adequate protections they require.  
There are three situations in which breach of the implied covenant of Good 
Faith and Fair Dealing can apply: 
(1) to allow the inclusion of additional terms and 
conditions not expressly set forth in the contract, but 
consistent with the parties’ contractual expectations; (2) to 
allow redress for a contracting party’s bad-faith 
performance of an agreement, when it is a pretext for the 
exercise of a contractual right to terminate, even where the 
defendant has not breached any express term; and (3) to 
rectify a party’s unfair exercise of discretion regarding its 
contract performance.137 
Under the first application, the covenant will supply additional terms to the 
contract so long as they are consistent with the parties’ expectations.138  
However, if one party has different expectations regarding this term, it may 
not be implied since it would be contrary to the party’s initial expectations 
when they entered into the contract.139  In the case of a municipality courting 
a sports team to their jurisdiction, it can usually be implied that the 
municipality expects, or at the least hopes, that the team will remain there 
for at least the foreseeable future.140  Teams however, by the mere fact that 
relocation has occurred in the past (including multiple relocations by some 
teams), seem to expect the possibility of future relocations.  Due to differing 
expectations, the implied covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing would 
likely fail to imply adequate protections under the first application. 
The second and third applications of the implied covenant of Good 
Faith and Fair Dealing provide even less support.  Under the second theory, 
a municipality would need to show a bad-faith performance by the team, 
which sparks a contractual right to terminate.141  In this case, it is not 
necessary to prove that the team actually breached any expressly written 
term.142  An argument can be made on behalf of the municipality that 
uprooting a team abruptly and in violation of their contract constitutes a bad-
 
 137   Barrows v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 465 F. Supp. 2d 347, 365 (D.N.J. 2006). 
 138   Id. 
 139   Id. 
 140   By numerous teams requiring lease lengths in excess of thirty years, it suggests that 
cities, especially at the creation of the contract, expect the team to remain there for a long 
time. 
 141   Barrows, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 365. 
 142   This is true because the term is implied, so it is not required to exist expressly within 
the contract. 
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faith performance on which the city may have a contractual right to 
terminate.  The third theory applies a similar line of reasoning, requiring a 
claim that the team unfairly exercised its discretion when relocating.143 
One major, glaring flaw in the application of both theories revolves 
around the language used to outline these applications.  The first theory 
explicitly allows for the “inclusion of additional terms,” while the second 
and third theories instead seek to “redress” and “rectify” the situation.144  In 
carefully choosing this language, the legislature allows the latter two theories 
to take many forms of relief.145  With such discretion in the type of relief, 
teams can seek redress most favorable to them—such as simply cutting a 
check—instead of actually inserting and drafting an additional term which 
they have limited power over writing.146  Such an ability completely 
undermines the capability of municipalities to protect themselves in the first 
place.  With that in mind, it appears that the implied covenant of Good Faith 
and Fair Dealing present in all contracts provides protections to parties 
unfairly injured, but its viability as a solution to protect against relocating 
sport teams in general is lacking. 
Since the current existing implied terms fail to give relocation 
protections to municipalities, implication of a term by statute is the only 
remaining option.  Although the implied covenant of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing began as a legal doctrine created by the courts, today the covenant 
has gained enough support that it is codified in a statute as well.147  Similarly, 
statutes throughout property,148 torts,149 and other areas of contract law150 
have implied terms into contracts.  The hurdle preventing implication of a 
term by statute here is that no such statute exists. 
 
 
 
 143   Barrows, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 365 (“(3) to rectify a party’s unfair exercise of discretion 
regarding its contract performance.”). 
 144   Barrows, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 365. 
 145   Seeking redress or rectification only looks to remedy the situation in some way.  These 
ways are not limited in the same way that the first theory is limited to solving the situation by 
only including additional terms.  Thus, there are presumably many different ways that would 
satisfy a redressing or rectifying the situation here. 
 146   Since the agreement has to be agreed to by both parties, both teams and cities are 
limited in their power to add favorable terms because the other side can simply disagree.  At 
this point, teams may be more willing to cut a check and relocate than to take their chances 
drafting the term. 
 147   See U.C.C. § 1-304. 
 148   See Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202 (Vt. 1984) (holding that an implied warranty of 
habitability exists in all residential leases). 
 149   See generally Ramsey v. Marutamaya Ogatsu Fireworks Co., 140 Cal. Rptr. 247 
(1977) (implying strict liability for inherently dangerous activities). 
 150   See U.C.C. § 2-309. 
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As of 2018, the home city was a contractual party in seventeen of the 
thirty-two (53%) NFL stadium leases.151  The NFL administers a hefty fee 
on teams who relocate, acting as a deterrent to relocation.152  In fact, the NFL 
even opposed the Raiders’ first relocation effort by unanimously voting 
against the effort.153  Not only does the league’s animosity towards teams 
relocating suggest that legislation in this area is necessary, but it is proven 
by the fact that despite the league’s efforts against it, the Raiders were still 
legally allowed to relocate and leave Oakland to foot the remaining bill.154  
In its discussion about the threat of team relocations, the court in Raiders 
went a step further to enlist the legislature in creating these protections: 
The spectre of such local action throughout the state or 
across the country demonstrates the need for uniform, 
national regulation. In these circumstances (and apart from 
other potential bases of commerce clause violation), to the 
text of the note if relocation threatens disproportionate harm 
to a local entity, regulation—if necessary—should come 
from Congress.155 
The peak of a team’s bargaining power lies within the ability to relocate at 
increasingly lower costs to themselves through public funding, which 
incidentally creates a pseudo black market for teams where they can 
essentially “shop” between municipalities for the best benefits.156  However, 
in order to propose effective legislation to solve the issue, it is important to 
recall what legislation already exists. 
 
 151  See generally Professional Sports Facility Lease Summaries (NFL), (Summer 2012), 
https://law.marquette.edu/national-sports-law-institute/professional-sports-facility-lease-
summaries. 
 152   Luke Kerr-Dineen, Why NFL Relocation Fees are the Biggest Boondoggle in Sports, 
FOR THE WIN (Mar. 28, 2017, 7:56AM), https://ftw.usatoday.com/2017/03/oakland-raiders-
las-vegas-move-relocation-fees-350-million (“Relocation fees for each the Chargers’ and the 
Rams’ move to Los Angeles were reportedly in the $600 million range per team.”). 
 153   L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Com. v. Nat’l Football League, 89 F.R.D. 497 (C.D. Cal. 1981) 
(“The NFL meeting at which the league formally voted not to approve a transfer of the 
Oakland Raiders to Los Angeles was held within the Central District.”). 
 154   See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 220 Cal. Rptr. 153 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). 
 155   Id. at 157. 
 156   See generally Barry Wilner, The NFL tends to award Super Bowl hosting duties to 
cities with new, state-of-the-art stadiums, BOSTON.COM (January 22, 2019), 
https://www.boston.com/sports/nfl/2019/01/22/super-bowl-nfl-new-stadium-atlanta (One 
such benefit given to new stadiums is the opportunity to host the Super Bowl.  The Atlanta 
Falcons completed construction of their brand-new stadium in 2017, and the facility is slated 
to host the 2019 Super Bowl); see also Sports Stadium Subsidies, The Heartland Institute, 
https://www.heartland.org/topics/government-spending/stadium-subsidies/index.html (“In 
the last few decades professional sports teams have also gained a great deal of bargaining 
power with relocation becoming more easily accomplished where it was once expensive and 
risky. Cities are now competing for new and relocating franchises, enticing teams with tax 
breaks and stadium funding.”). 
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C. Current Legislative Efforts 
In the wake of the Browns relocation to Baltimore, Browns fans in 
Cleveland were notably upset about how things unfolded.157  In an effort to 
prevent the same heart-ripping tragedy in the future, Ohio created a statute 
commonly known today as the Modell Rule.158  The Modell Rule, named 
after Browns owner Art Modell, states the following: 
No owner of a professional sports team that uses a tax-
supported facility for most of its home games and receives 
financial assistance from the state or a political subdivision 
thereof shall cease playing most of its home games at the 
facility and begin playing most of its home games elsewhere 
unless the owner either: 
(A) Enters into an agreement with the political 
subdivision permitting the team to play most of its home 
games elsewhere; or 
(B) Gives the political subdivision in which the facility 
is located not less than six months’ advance notice of the 
owner’s intention to cease playing most of its home games 
at the facility and, during the six months after such notice, 
gives the political subdivision or any individual or group of 
individuals who reside in the area the opportunity to 
purchase the team.159 
The Modell Rule effectively prevents the relocation of a sports team in Ohio 
unless the team either receives explicit permission from the municipality to 
relocate or gives the municipality advanced notice of leave,160 and 
additionally offers to individuals from the area a right of first refusal to 
purchase the team.161  The key aspect of this statute is its narrow scope; it 
applies only to a professional sports team that “uses a tax-supported 
facility . . . and receives financial assistance from the state or a political 
subdivision.”162  Thus, under this statute, a team that plays in a privately built 
stadium would be permitted to relocate wherever and whenever it saw fit. 
 
 157   Branson Wright, Cleveland Browns Move to Baltimore Left City Stunned, left city 
stunned, angered: PD 175th, CLEVELAND.COM (Apr. 30, 2017), 
https://www.cleveland.com/ohio-sports-
blog/2017/04/cleveland_browns_move_to_balti.html. 
 158   Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 9.67 (1996). 
 159   Id. 
 160   Id. (Owners must give advanced notice of at least six months). 
 161   What is RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL?, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 
https://thelawdictionary.org/right-of-first-refusal/ (“A right in a contract where the seller must 
give the other party the chance to match the offer that a third party has given to buy a certain 
asset.”). 
 162   Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 9.67 (1996) (emphasis added). 
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International sports are no stranger to public ownership.163  The 
Bundesliga, Germany’s top soccer league, instituted a rule in 1998 called the 
50+1 Rule.164  The rule prevents football clubs in the Bundesliga from 
engaging in interleague play if commercial investors own more than a 49% 
stake in the company.165  In other words, the rule requires each team to be 
more than 50% owned by the public, including fans.166  Before enacting the 
rule, any kind of private ownership was forbidden.167  The Bundesliga’s 
intent in implementing the rule was to prevent private investors from 
attaining personal and dominant control of the team.168  Without dominant 
control of the team, investors could not unilaterally prioritize profit over the 
fans who form the backbones of the teams.169  Thus, the rule would prohibit 
relocation without the support of fans and general public, who comprise a 
majority ownership stake. 
Since its enactment, the 50+1 Rule has been seemingly effective in the 
Bundesliga, as the league now boasts the highest average attendances in 
football across the world.170  Although successful in Germany, the adoption 
of the same rule in the United States would not be feasible.  The first reason 
is that the rule controls soccer teams in Germany, who traditionally refrain 
from relocating as often as United States sport teams.171  Second, as currently 
situated, every professional team in the United States is privately owned 
except for the NFL Green Bay Packers.172  Instituting a similar rule requiring 
fan ownership of professional franchise ownership would require all the 
existing private team owners to divest themselves of their ownership stake 
in excess of over 50%.173  It is easy to see how such a situation would be at 
 
 163   See generally BUNDESLIGA, German soccer rules: 50+1 explained, bundesliga.com 
(Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.bundesliga.com/en/news/Bundesliga/german-soccer-rules-50-
1-fifty-plus-one-explained-466583.jsp.; See also  
 164   Id. 
 165   Id. 
 166   Id. 
 167   Id. 
 168   Id. 
 169   BUNDESLIGA, supra note 163. 
 170   BUNDESLIGA, supra note 163. 
 171   Bayer 04 Leverkusen, BayArena: A Stadium With A Long History, BAYER 04 
LEVERKUSEN, https://www.bayer04.de/en-us/news/bayer04/bayarena-a-stadium-with-a-long-
history?vid=20180912_BayArena_W 
Andel (Bayer Leverkusen, for example, has been in the same venue since 1958). 
 172   Kalyn Kahler, Green Bay Packers Inc., Owners of Green Bay Packers, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED (July 17, 2018), https://www.si.com/nfl/green-bay-packers-shareholders-team-
owners (“The Packers pride themselves on being the only publicly-owned, not-for-profit, 
major league professional team in the United States.”). 
 173   This assumes that a grandfather provision would be ineffective in the United States 
since all teams except the Green Bay Packers would be then be grandfathered in, rendering 
the effort useless. 
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least problematic, if not nearly impossible.174 
Applying the Modell Rule and the 50+1 Rule, the relocations of the 
Oilers, Raiders, and Browns today would have likely resulted in different 
outcomes.  For example, loyal Browns fans with majority ownership of the 
team under the 50+1 Rule likely would have prevented management from 
relocating the team to a different city.175  Even without the 50+1 rule, the 
Modell Rule would give the Cleveland the ability to deny the team’s request 
to relocate assuming that a potential buyer would exercise the right of first 
refusal.  However, neither the fans nor Cleveland, had such power. 
Professional sports leagues in the United States are in a unique position.  
The lack of protections against relocation have only come to light since 
teams started to relocate, and such protections have so far originated only by 
fans and city residents.176  While the only state with protections is Ohio,177 
the other forty-nine states remain completely vulnerable to a team’s abrupt 
relocation.  As such, it is appropriate for New Jersey to create and enact 
legislation that provides municipalities adequate protections against 
franchise relocation.  The following section proposes new legislation which 
serves to protect such interests. 
D. Legislation Proposal 
Professional teams and leagues are not a single entity, so a solution does 
not require a rule for the entire league at once.178  Instead, an approach 
focusing on individual teams will provide a comprehensive solution without 
setting off a missile to kill a mouse.  Although not perfect, the Modell Rule 
provides New Jersey with a firm foundation in which to construct its own 
legislation giving municipalities protections.  Similar to the Modell Rule, 
New Jersey’s statute should limit its scope to sports teams that receive 
financial assistance from the state or municipality.179  The Modell Rule also 
requires the team to use a tax-supported facility for most of its home 
 
 174   Raphael Honigstein, What would happen if Bundesliga clubs scrapped ‘50+1’ 
Ownership?, ESPN (Mar. 9, 2018), http://www.espn.com/soccer/german-
bundesliga/10/blog/post/3412475/what-would-happen-if-bundesliga-clubs-scrapped-50+1-
ownership-rule (“[W]ell-situated clubs have found it incredibly hard to attract minority 
shareholders who are happy to forego control.”). 
 175   Cleveland Browns: One of the best fan bases in the world, FOX SPORTS (Jun. 30, 
2017), https://www.foxsports.com/nfl/story/cleveland-browns-one-of-the-best-fan-bases-in-
the-world-111216 (“But the love of the team has never wavered, as Browns fans take pride in 
sticking with the team in hopes of a better tomorrow.”). 
 176   The Modell Rule was enacted by the citizens of Ohio through a referendum. 
 177   See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 9.67 (1996). 
 178   L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1388-89 
(9th Cir. 1984). 
 179   See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 9.67 (1996). 
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games,180 but such a requirement makes this rule overly narrow.  In requiring 
both conditions simultaneously, a municipality could presumably allow a 
team that plays in a private facility to receive financial assistance, but not 
subject itself to the limitations on relocating.  By limiting the scope just to 
teams receiving financial assistance from the state or municipality, it would 
necessarily cover teams that use taxpayer money to construct stadiums. 
The Modell Rule specifically prevents the affected team from playing 
“most of its home games” in a different location.181  This limitation also 
poses too narrow of a restriction.  Specifically, using the word “most” grants 
the relocating team considerable leeway in working around the statute.  The 
word “most” by definition only requires a majority,182 meaning a team could 
decide to play 49% of their games in a different location and comply with 
the statute.  By using a different word, such as “all,” it would prohibit a 
relocation of any degree. 
The Modell Rule’s second condition provides another glaring 
weakness.  This condition requires the team to give the municipality or state 
advance notice of its intention to leave and further offers individuals in the 
area a right of first refusal.183  Advance notice gives investors of teams an 
option to get out by selling the team instead of relocating.184  Granting a right 
of first refusal to individuals of the state or municipality attempts to shift 
power back to the municipality by allowing the municipality to unilaterally 
keep the team so long as it has a viable purchaser.185  However, in many 
municipalities, there will not be an individual who is both willing and able 
to buy the team.  This is especially true as the value of teams have exploded 
into the billions of dollars.186  Without anybody to step up, the team could 
potentially still relocate even if the municipality did not want it to, simply 
because the municipality did not have a buyer, a loophole which further 
undermines the protections sought here. 
Against the current landscape of professional sports teams’ movement 
and fluidity, New Jersey should enact legislation giving its cities protections 
against the relocation of their teams.  Such a statutory protective model will 
 
 180   Id. 
 181   Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 9.67 (1996). 
 182   Most, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/most. 
 183   See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 9.67 (1996). 
 184   Id. 
 185   Id. 
 186   Kurt Badenhausen, Full List: The World’s 50 Most Valuable Sports Teams of 2018, 
FORBES (Jul 18, 2018 10:36AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2018/07/18/full-list-the-worlds-50-most-
valuable-sports-teams-of-2018/#3fafbc586b0e (explaining there are eleven sports franchises 
in the United States which are valued at $3 billion or more.). 
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likely fall under Title 40 (Municipalities and Counties),187 and should use 
Ohio’s Modell Rule as a rough foundation.188  The statute will read: 
An owner of a professional sports team who receives 
taxpayer backed funding on behalf of any state, city, or 
political subdivision herein, is prohibited from relocating 
their team to any location unless either: 
(1) A benefit, equal in value to the total amount of 
taxpayer backed funding, is repaid back the state, 
city, or political subdivision. 
a. The repayment period begins on the date 
the funding is disbursed. The first payment 
is due within 60 days after the date the 
funding is disbursed. 
i. For funding up to $100 million, 
complete repayment is due 10 
years from the date the loan is 
disbursed. 
ii. For funding between $100 and 
$500 million, complete 
repayment is due 20 years from 
the date the loan is disbursed. 
iii. For funding above $500 million, 
complete repayment is due 30 
years from the date the loan is 
disbursed. 
iv. Extension of the repayment 
period is prohibited unless a 
subsequent agreement requests 
improvements, repairs, or any 
agreed upon event 
(2) An agreement is reached with the state, city, or 
political subdivision granting the team permission 
to relocate. 
Comments to this statute should define “relocating” to mean “playing 
any of the team’s designated ‘home games’ in a facility other than its home 
stadium.”  This comment should further reserve an exception to this 
definition for “specialty games,” which include games played at a neutral 
location due to acts of God, charity events, or league initiatives.189  Most 
 
 187   N.J. Stat. § 40. 
 188   See generally Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 9.67 (1996). 
 189   League initiatives include international games played for the purpose of league 
GULDNER(DO NOT DELETE) 4/4/2020  2:19 AM 
370 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 44:2 
importantly, however, the comments should define “benefit” to constitute 
“any tangible or intangible property mutually agreed upon by the parties.”  
By expanding the definition of benefit, this allows for a degree of creativity 
for both sides in negotiating a deal because instead of repaying actual dollars, 
teams can offer other, more specific benefits that tailor themselves to both 
the owner and the municipality.  These benefits can include anything like a 
percentage of concession profits, voting power, investment in a particular 
industry of the municipality, repairs to a blighted community, etc.  For added 
measure, the comments should also state that this term implies in all sports 
law contracts, then allowing for implication of the term by statute in existing 
contracts. 
In terms of the municipality, this legislation gives them the ability to 
leverage their geographical location advantageously in a way they have 
never been able to before.  At the same time, owners can now leverage their 
expertise, connections, etc. in order to drive down their risk of repaying the 
loan, especially with owners having massive expertise in some area.  An 
alternative way to think about this would be to compare it to a barter and 
trade agreement.  Take the following example as an illustration: owner A is 
a wealthy man from Texas, who earned his fortune through construction.  
Owner A wants to move his team, located in Texas, to a remote area of New 
Jersey.  Lacking a major city to play in, this may seem like a less attractive 
place to move a team. 
As a solution, the municipality may creatively ask for construction of 
$250 million worth of townhouses near the stadium as “repayment” for a 
$250 million loan.  For the municipality, this is good because it creates new 
housing, which significantly increases the population and attempts to 
stimulate the economy.  The construction request is also attractive to the 
owner since, being in construction, they would presumably have 
comparative and competitive advantages in this area, which would allow him 
to build this housing cheaper and more efficiently than others.  Even though 
the real, raw value of the construction is $250 million at the end of the day, 
the ability of the owner to “repay” this value in their area of expertise reduces 
their perceived risk and allows them to build on their competitive 
advantages.  At this point, thanks to the new legislation, a remote area of 
New Jersey, which usually would stand a limited chance of obtaining a 
professional sports team, suddenly has a very realistic chance of courting 
one. 
Another key feature of this statute is the variable repayment period, 
based on the total amount of taxpayer funds the municipality contributes.  
This system provides advantages to both municipalities and team owners 
 
growth. 
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alike.  Since the repayment periods are concretely set, the municipality does 
not need to bargain for this term.  The elimination of bargaining poses an 
obvious benefit due to the fact that, as evidenced throughout this comment, 
municipalities are often in an inferior bargaining position.190  Additionally, 
this is beneficial for team owners since they can now take longevity into their 
own hands.  If an owner wants to be able to move their team readily, they 
can simply take less than $100 million in tax funds and be able to freely 
move in fewer years with no strings attached.  If the owner repays the value 
in a shorter amount of time, then they can relocate even sooner. 
In creating these parameters, New Jersey will effectively secure 
protections for municipalities against the relocation of professional sports 
teams.  The first condition of this proposed statute will require a return of a 
benefit to the municipality, which is equal in value to the amount of taxpayer 
funds given to the team.  This condition purposefully uses and describes the 
word “benefit” to allow both parties to define exactly what tangible or 
intangible property constitutes the “benefit” given and received.191  A second 
condition acts as a safety net for teams, allowing them to agree on their own 
terms regarding a proposed relocation.  By reserving this in just the team, it 
ensures that a team could never relocate against the will of the municipality.  
Utilized together, New Jersey municipalities should enjoy full protection of 
their taxpayer funding without fear of relocation. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This comment analyzed the landscape of sports team relocation and 
how municipalities are unprotected from teams relocating, even after 
securing millions of dollars in taxpayer funding.  This comment did not 
discuss whether the moral issues of cities themselves courting professional 
teams or whether or not a municipality should be able to use tax money to 
support a stadium.  In fact, this comment assumed both are allowable.  This 
comment argued that eminent domain is a less than viable option because of 
uncertainties surrounding the application of the “just compensation” and 
“public use” requirements.  Additionally, express terms and implied terms 
are ineffective as adequate protections due to disproportionate bargaining 
power between the municipality and team.  Instead, the legislature must 
enact its own statute to provide such protections when a municipality 
 
 190   Clifton B. Parker, Sports Stadiums Do Not Generate Significant Local Economic 
Growth, Stanford Expert Says, STANFORD NEWS (July 30, 2015), 
https://news.stanford.edu/news/2015/july/stadium-economics-noll-073015.html (“Cities 
have very little bargaining power with an NFL team.  As long as there are cities without NFL 
teams that are willing to subsidize a stadium, cities will have to pay part of the cost of a new 
stadium.”). 
 191   Such benefits can include repayment of the taxpayer money, exclusive rights to use 
the stadium, or whatever the parties see fair. 
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contributes taxpayer funding to building or repairing a stadium.  The statute 
should state that if the team gets any such money, it must keep using the 
home location until the municipality receives repayment of the funding in 
some value.  The terms for the repayment of the loan, however, are defined 
by whatever the parties agree, whether through cash repayments or other 
means.  Through this route, the state would ensure that municipalities receive 
adequate protections against relocation, allowing the team-municipality 
relationship to flourish in the future. 
 
